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REQUIRING REIMBURSEMENT FROM THE INVOLUNTARILY
COMMITTED - Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement
Commission, 429 So. 2d 574 (Miss. 1983).
FACTS
Ernest B. Covington, thirty-eight years old, was involuntarily
committed to the Mississippi State Hospital at Whitfield in March
of 1951. In the commitment proceeding in chancery court, Cov-
ington was found to be mentally ill and in need of treatment,
based on his threats of physical harm to others, and on the
diagnosis of paranoid psychosis made by the two examining physi-
cians. At the Mississippi State Hospital, Covington was diagnos-
ed as paranoid schizophrenic.'
In July of 1953, Covington, no longer hospitalized,2 made an
attempt on the life of the chancellor who had originally ordered
his commitment.' A new commitment proceeding was instituted,
and after physicians diagnosed Covington as paranoid
schizophrenic, the court "promptly entered the commitment
order."' Covington was then returned to Whitfield, where he re-
mained until his death in 1979. At the hospital, electroconvulsive
therapy was administered to Covington frequently (once or twice
a week, during some periods), despite his protests.' Described
by the hospital staff as hostile and potentially homicidal, Cov-
ington was lobotomized6 on January 18, 1957. He continued to
receive electroconvulsive therapy. On December 18, 1979, Ernest
B. Covington died.7
I. Paranoid schizophrenia is a mental disorder characterized by severe distortions of reality, particularly
delusions of persecution and delusions of grandeur. Paranoid psychosis, a phrase often used to describe a similar
pathology, is a slightly more general term, with less emphasis on the distortion of the thought processes. L.
BOURNE & B. EKSTRAND, PSYCHOLOGY: ITS PRINCIPLES AND MEANINGS 449-58 (1979). According to records
from the Mississippi State Hospital, Covington believed that the railroad company was spying on him, that
the telephone company had "tapped" his telephone lines, and that "the Catholics" were conspiring against him.
2. There is no clear indication whether Covington was released, escaped, or simply left the hospital of
his own accord. Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Comm'n, 429 So. 2d 574, 577 (Miss. 1983).
3. Record at 89, Chill.
4. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 577.
5. Although there is no Mississippi case law on the subject, the New York Supreme Court has held that,
under New York law, electroconvulsive therapy may not be administered without the patient's consent, if the
patient has the requisite mental capacity to understand the effect of his consent or refusal. The language of
the New York statute construed in New York Health and Hosp. Corp. v. Stein, 70 Misc. 2d 944, 335 N.Y.S.
2d 461 (Sup. Ct. 1972), required simply that there be "consent," without indentifying the party from whom
that consent must be had. The court noted that if the patient lacked the requisite mental capacity, then the con-
sent was to be from the nearest relative, the guardian, or - if there were no relative or guardian - the court.
But see Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp. 1131 (D.N.J. 1978); Mabry v. Hoye, 124 Miss. 144, 87 So. 4 (1921).
6. Psychosurgery, like electroconvulsive therapy, is currently the subject of much controversy in the areas
of law and medicine. For a discussion of patient's rights with regard to such modes of treatment, see PRACTIS-
ING LAW INSTITUTE, MENTAL HEALTH LAW PROJECT: LEGAL RIGHTS OF MENTAiLY DISABLED PERSONS (1979).
7. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 574.
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During the years of Covington's confinement, his guardian
periodically made small payments to the Mississippi State Hospital
at Whitfield. In March of 1983, the Mississippi Hospital Reim-
bursement Commission (appellee) probated a claim against Cov-
ington's estate for the cost of his care and treatment from July
1, 1962,8 until the time of his death. Bernard W. N. Chill, Sr.
(appellant), administrator of the estate, contested the claim. The
chancery court found for the Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement
Commission in the amount of $16,230.80. Chill appealed to the
Supreme Court of the State of Mississippi. 9
HISTORY AND BACKGROUND
When the first institutions for the mentally ill in the United States
were established in the 1700's, commitment "procedures" usual-
ly consisted of a simple request that a person be confined to an
asylum. If the person requesting confinement successfully per-
suaded a doctor or asylum employee that his request was valid,
the commitment was carried out.1" Since that time, advances made
in the areas of personal liberties and due process have required
modification and regulation of the commitment procedure.1 To-
day civil commitment is governed by statute, and state statutes
provide for varying degrees of due process, from specifying a
right to jury trial12 to allowing a hearing only by request, after
hospitalization. 3
In Mississippi, any interested person may initiate an involun-
tary civil commitment by filing an affidavit with the chancery clerk
of the county in which the person alleged to be mentally ill resides
8. July 1, 1962, is the effective date of the Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission Act which
provides that the patient, his estate, or other persons legally chargeable may be required to reimburse the state
for care in a state hospital. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 (1972 & Supp. 1983). The claim was for care and
treatment from that date until the time of Covington's death. The award made by the chancery court, approx-
imately 35% of the original claim, depleted most of the estate, which had already been decreased by a widow's
allowance and legal fees,
9. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 574.
10. F. LINDMAN & D. MCINTYRE, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW 16 (1961).
1I. See generally Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970); In re Barnard, 455 F.2d 1370 (D.C. Cir. 1971);
Hesyford v. Parker. 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968).
12. See, e.g., Mental Health Code of Illinois § 5-4. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 91 1/2, § .8-6 (Smith-Hurd 1966).
The Illinois statute requires a jury of six. If the purpose of the adjudication is to determine need for medical
treatment, then one of the jurors must be a physician. If the purpose of the adjudication is to determine mental
retardation, then one of the jurors must be either a physician or a psychologist. In either case. the professional
is chosen by the court. In an emergency, the Illinois statute does provide for brief hospitalization without a hearing.
13. See, e.g., N.Y. MENTAL HYGIENE LAW § 9.27-9.31 (McKinney 1978). The New York statute pro-
vides for a hearing at the request of the patient or anyone acting on his behalf, after involuntary hospitalization.
The requirements for the original admission are an application for admission-which may be made by a relative,
a hospital director, or other such specified person-and certificates from two physicians.
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or is present. The requirements for the affidavit are that it include
specific descriptions of the alleged incompetent's recent behavior,
including names of witnesses; that it name the next of kin; and
that it be accompanied by a filing fee, if the person filing can af-
ford it. If the affidavit includes allegations of fact and names of
witnesses and is thus sufficient to support the need of treatment,
the sheriff is then authorized to bring the person into custody.
The alleged incompetent is then examined by two physicians or
by a physician and a psychologist.
If the examiners certify that the person is in need of treatment,
a hearing before the chancellor or special master is set, and the
alleged incompetent or his attorney is notified. During the hear-
ing he has the right to counsel and the right against self-
incrimination. The alleged incompetent has the right to be pres-
sent at the hearing. If it is shown by clear and convincing proof
that the person is mentally ill, and if the chancellor finds no less
restrictive alternative, the person may be initially committed for
three months. The commitment, however, may not be carried out
until the director of the institution involved determines that
facilities and services are available." At the time of Convington's
orginial commitment, Mississippi law provided for a hearing only
after hospitalization, and then only if requested. 5
Historically, involuntary civil commitments have been justified
on two principles: police power 6 and parens patriae." Perhaps
the better accepted of these two is the police power justification. 8
In its regulatory capacity as protector of the public, the state ex-
ercises control over those individuals who, by reason of mental
disturbance, pose a serious threat to the safety of others.
The parens patriae justification for civil commitment finds its
origin in the concept that the state benevolently protects and pro-
vides for those citizens who are, in some way, unable to care for
themselves." Some commentators see a less compelling state in-
terest in parens patriae than in police power,20 and there is some
doubt whether the deprivation of liberty inherent in a civil com-
14. MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-21-65 to -73 (1972 & Supp. 1983).
15. MISS. CODE ANN. § 6909-08 (1942).
16. Lynch v. Overholser, 369 U.S. 705, 711 (1962); Payne v. Arkebauer, 190 Ark. 614, 80 S.W.2d 76
(1935); Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 2d 1351 (Miss. 1981).
17. Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 (1979); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
18. Note, Procedural Safeguards for the Involuntary Commitment of the Mentally Ill in the District of Col-
umbia, 28 CATH. U.L. REv. 855 (1979).
19. Mormon Church v. U.S., 136 U.S. 1, 58 (1890); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Bethany v. Stubbs, 393 So. 2d 1351, 1353 (Miss. 1981).
20. See Curtis, The Checkered Career of Parens Patriae: The State as Parent or Tyrant?, 25 DE PAUL
L. REv. 895 (1976); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1966).
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mitment is justified adequately by the state's "benign...
purposes." "
Once a person is involuntarily committed, his maintenance and
care may be costly.22 Although at common law the state was
responsible for this burden, "3 all fifty states today have statutes
that provide for reimbursement to the state from the patient, his
estate, or his relatives.2"
The Mississippi statute construed in Chill provides that
hospitalization shall be free of charge for those who cannot af-
ford to pay, but that no person is entitled to free treatment if his
estate or income is sufficient to pay for all or part of his care,
or if there are persons legally responsible for his support who
are able to pay for his care." The act also requires the commis-
sion to adopt policies that "will not work an undue hardship" on
persons required to pay, and that the amount charged should be
in proportion to the ability to pay.26
Although the statute thus summarized was applied in Chill, the
code section has been amended27 by the legislature (effective March
14, 1983) to provide that the patient, his estate, his parents (if
an unmarried minor), or his spouse - rather than "persons legal-
ly chargeable" - can be required to reimburse the state. This
change does not affect such situations as the one presented in Chill,
where the estate is required to reimburse, but it may prove signifi-
cant in terms of certain constitutional issues. 8
Chill is the first case construing Mississippi's reimbursement
statute as applied to the involuntarily committed. In cases from
other jurisdictions, justification for reimbursement statutes is often
found in the reasonableness of requiring the patient to pay for
treatment from which he benefits, "9 or in the moral obligation of
the family to provide for the care of the mental patient, ° or in
the theory that the family derives benefit from the commitment
and thus should bear the financial burden.31 At least one case ap-
pears to base enforcement of the statute on deference to the
21. Martarella v. Kelley. 349 F. Supp. 575, 585 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
22. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 343.
23. In re Bedford, II N.J. Misc. 589, 168 A. 134 (1933); Wiseman v. State, 94 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1936).
24. E.g., ALA. CODE § 22-53-1 (1975); CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 7282 (West 1984); FLA. STAT.
§ 402.17 (1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 34, § 2512 (1978), N.Y. MENTAL HYG. LAW § 43.03 (McKinney
1978); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43A, § III (West 1979).
25. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 (1972).
26. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-7-79 (1972).
27. MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 (Supp. 1983).
28. See infra text accompanying notes 65-70.
29. In re Walters, 278 Pa. 421, 422, 123 A. 408, 409 (1924).
30. Beach v. Gov't. of Dist. of Columbia, 320 F.2d 790 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 943 (1963).
31. Kough v. Hoehler, 413 Il1. 409, 109 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
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legislature, relying almost entirely on the language of the statute
itself.32 A few cases construing reimbursement statutes have found
that there was a duty, at common law, for the estate or relatives
of the patient to provide for his maintenance and care, and have
based the validity of statutes partially on this finding. 3" In the great
majority of cases, reimbursement statutes have been held to be
valid.3 " There are, however, cases in which reimbursement statutes
have been held to be invalid, usually on constitutional grounds.
In Department of Mental Hygiene v. Hawley," the requiring of
payment from the relatives of a person found not guilty by reason
of insanity was held to be a violation of the relatives' fundamen-
tal rights. After reasoning that the state should bear the expense
because the state receives the benefit of the confinement (protec-
tion of the public), the Hawley court makes an exception - that
the patient himself or his estate may be charged, an apparent non
sequitur from the theory of benefit to the state.
Another of the few cases striking down reimbursement statutes
is Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kirchner.36 In Kirchner, a
statute requiring reimbursement from the relatives of a patient
failed to withstand a challenge based on an equal protection theory.
The reasoning in Kirchner was that there is no basis for requir-
ing one adult to pay for the care of another adult in a mental
hospital. Although several subsequent California cases 7 have
upheld statutes imposing liability on relatives of persons civilly
committed, those cases have been distinguished on the grounds
that the relative from whom the state sought reimbursement was
otherwise legally responsible for the support of the patient. Thus
limited, the Kirchner rule is that requiring reimbursement from
a person not otherwise legally responsible for support violates the
principle of equal protection.
32. In re Bedford, II N.J. Misc. 589, 168 A. 134 (1933), 'The minimum rate of payment for the maintenance
of any nonindigent patient shall be fixed by the board of managers ... and shall be construed to be a reasonable
charge for the care and treatment of any such patient .... Id. at , 168 A. at 137 (quoting 1929
N.J. LAws 441, as amended by ch. 332, § 2).
33. E.g., Luder's Adm'r v. State, 152 S.W. 220 (Tex. Civ. App. 1912).
34. Gartner v. U.S.. 166 F.2d 728 (9th Cir. 1948); Napa State Hospital v. Dasso. 153 Cal. 698. 96 P.
355 (1908); State v. Romme. 93 Conn. 571. 107 A. 519 (1919); Warren v. Pope, 64 So. 2d 564 (Fla. 1953):
McKenna v. Roberts County, 72 S.D. 250, 32 N.W.2d 687 (1948); Green v. State. 272 S.W.2d 133 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1954).
35. 59 Cal. 2d 247, 379, P.2d 22. 28 Cal. Rptr. 718 (1963).
36. 60 Cal. 2d 716, 388 P.2d 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1964), vacated on other grounds, 380 U.S. 194 (1964),
on remand, 62 Cal. 2d 586, 400 P.2d 321, 43 Cal. Rptr. 329 (1965).
37. Department of Mental Hygiene v. Kolts, 247 Cal. App. 2d 154, 55 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1966); In re Preston's
Estate, 243 Cal. App. 2d 803, 52 Cal. Rptr. 790 (1966); Guardianship of Hicks, 228 Cal. App. 2d 629, 39
Cal. Rptf. 698 (1964).
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INSTANT CASE
Chill v. Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission, an ap-
plication of the Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Act, is a case
of first impression 8 in Mississippi. The court states the question
as "whether, under what circumstances, and with what procedural
safeguards, may the state demand of the estate of one involun-
tarily civilly committed to the Mississippi State Hospital (MSH)
at Whitfield reimbursement for all or part of the cost of care and
treatment there rendered?" 9 The appellant's argument was that,
because Covington's procedural due process rights were violated
at the commitment proceedings, the reimbursement claim must
fail. Chill did not persuade the court to accompany him on his
"quantum leap"' from lack of due process at the commitment hear-
ing to failure of the reimbursement claim. Rather, the court re-
mained solidly within the realm of fundamental, "hornbook" law
when it held that "the only procedural due process rights of
relevance were those of appellant Chill, as administrator of Cov-
ington's estate. '"1
The court employed a two-part analysis to reach its conclusion.
First, in order to determine whether substantive rights had been
violated by requiring reimbursement from the estate, the court
addressed the issue of what substantive rights were at stake, and
concluded that the rights in question were those of Chill as ad-
ministrator of the estate. In determining whether those rights had
been violated (the second part of the analysis), the court noted
that Chill had been provided notice and a hearing, and that the
Hospital Reimbursement Commission had proven the elements
of its claim - that Covington was mentally ill, that the state pro-
vided care and treatment,. that the services were reasonably
necessary, and that the sum required to be reimbursed was
reasonable. "4
The court stated that, had Chill been able to disprove any of
those elements, he would have had a defense to the claim. It was
not, however, a defense to assert the violation of Covington's
rights. So long as the Hospital Reimbursement Commission
38. Watkins v. Watkins, 337 So. 2d 723 (Miss. 1976), involved a child support award which the father
had been ordered to pay for his mentally retarded son, who was thirteen years old at the time of the divorce.
After the son reached the age of majority, the mother attempted to have the child support continued, even
though the son was able to earn a small salary. The court held that Missisippi's reimbursement statute had
no bearing on the claim.
39. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 576.
40. id. at 582.
41. Id. at 584.
42. Id. at 583.
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proved that Covington was mentally ill (along with the other
elements of the claim), the violation of Covington's rights was
of no consequence to the reimbursement claim. 3
ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION
As a case of first impression in Mississippi, Chill is significant
in two ways: it identifies the circumstances under which a reim-
bursement claim may be allowed against the estate of one civilly
committed, and it deals with certain constitutional challenges to
the Mississippi reimbursement statute. The language used by the
court in defining the "carefully limited circumstances" 44 under
which such claims will be allowed - phrases such as "in need
of mental treatment," "humane conditions," and "minimally ade-
quate care and treatment" 5 - seems subject to a broad range of
interpretations particularly when viewed in light of the meanings
that appear to be assigned to those phrases in this case. A cur-
sory reading of Chill might leave the reader with the impression
that one can be found to be "in need of treatment" without being
afforded procedural due process, but such is not the case. Because
of the lack of due process in the commitment hearings, the
Mississippi Hospital Reimbursement Commission was required
to prove anew that Covington was indeed mentally ill, rather than
relying on the results of the commitment hearings. 6 In fact, the
court recognizes the requirement of clear and convincing proof
for civil commitment47 set forth by the United States Supreme
Court in Addington v. Texas. 8 Neither does the Chill court hold
that unwanted lobotomies and electroconvulsive therapy sessions
constitute "humane conditions" and "minimally adequate treat-
ment." The court simply recognizes that these measures were ade-
quate and humane in light of psychiatric knowledge at the time
Covington was treated. The three elements articulated by the court
- need of treatment, humane conditions, and minimally adequate
treatment - cannot be defined completely by one case and will
continue to be developed and described as cases arise in which
they must be interpreted.
Although Chill deals with constitutional challenges to the
43. Id. at 585.
44. Id. at 576.
45. Id. at 579.
46. Id. at 585.
47. Id. at 582. For purposes of the reimbursement claim, however, the preponderance standard suffices.
48. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
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Mississippi reimbursement statute, it leaves several constitutional
questions unanswered - questions similar to those addressed in
Hawley and Kirchner. By emphasizing the due process question,
the appellant failed to direct the court's attention to more valid
constitutional challenges, and so those challenges will not be ad-
dressed until they are brought before the court in future cases. 9
The focus of the appellant's argument in Chill was the violation
of Covington's rights at the time of his original commitment. Had
the appellant stressed the question whether reimbursement itself
is valid, particularly in the case of an involuntary commitment,
the goal of which was - at least partially - the protection of
the public, the holding might have addressed more directly the
issue of comparative benefit and corresponding financial respon-
sibility. Mississippi's reimbursement statute has yet to be examined
in light of the Hawley and Kirchner comparative-benefit theory.
The Hawley court would not allow relatives of a person found
not guilty by reason of insanity to be held liable for his support,
since the state benefitted from the commitment; but the court then
stated that the patient himself (or his estate) could be charged.
This curious exception highlights what is, perhaps, a cogent
challenge to reimbursement statutes: "requiring reimbursement
from patients is a violation of equal protection when the state does
not require similar reimbursement from a prisoner for the costs
of his confinement. '"5 ° If the statute is to be struck down on the
basis that the benefit is primarily to the state (as in a confinement
of a penal nature), there is no basis for the distinction between
the patient himself and his relatives. Such a distinction seems
logical under a parens patriae rationale, but not under the police
power rationale posited by the Hawley court. Thus, any justifica-
tion offered for the existence of reimbursement statutes, and any
scheme for determining to whom such statutes may justly be ap-
plied, are both grounded in the purpose of the commitment; and
that purpose may be ascertained by answering one question: who
benefits from the commitment? If, as the Hawley court seems to
indicate, the state receives the main benefit, then it would appear
that the state should bear the cost. A noteworthy distinction is
the one made between the exercise of the police power against
criminals (or defendants in criminal cases) and the exercise of
the police power against the mentally ill (or those alleged to be
so). Although criminals are considered more culpable than men-
49. United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
50. Note. Developments in the Law; Civil Commitment of the Mentally/II, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1190. 1367-68
(1974).
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tally ill persons,"1 there are at least three important aspects in which
the criminal has a distinct advantage over the dangerous mental
patient. First, a criminal defendant is entitled to the fullest exer-
cise of procedural due process, but a person subjected to a com-
mitment hearing is not. 2 Second, a person normally must commit
a crime in order to be confined, but a mentally ill person may
be confined on the basis of what he may do in the future.5 " Third,
a convicted criminal is sentenced for a specific period, but one
civilly committed may be confined indefinitely." This distinction
between the criminal and the mentally ill person gains increased
importance in the consideration of reimbursement statutes.5
Despite the questionable distinction Hawley makes between the
patient and his family (in terms of benefit and corresponding finan-
cial responsibility), both Hawley and Kirchner suggest a standard
for determining the validity of reimbursement statutes and their
application: comparative benefit from the commitment; that is,
he who benefits most, pays most. Although it is not within the
scope of this article to suggest a detailed scheme for determining
comparative benefits resulting from the hospitalization of the men-
tally ill, some determining factors may be enumerated: whether
hospital conditions evidence treatment, custody, or punishment;
whether the person committed is dangerous; and whether the com-
mitment is the result of some criminal act.
Despite the difficulties in determining the benefits and cor-
responding responsibilities of the state and the patient, there ap-
pears to be a simpler basis for determining the duty of relatives,
regardless of the purpose of or justification (whether police power
or parens patriae) for the commitment. As articulated in Kirchner,
a relative otherwise legally responsible for support of the patient
derives economic benefit from the commitment simply because
the state provides the basic support he would otherwise provide."
Thus a person otherwise legally chargeable may justly be required
to compensate the state, particularly if he can afford to do so.
On the same basis, a person who is a relative of the patient, but
who is not in a relationship which entails a duty of support, derives
little more benefit than friends of the patient, or the public at large;
51. United States v. Freeman. 357 F.2d606(2dCir. 1966); M'Naghten's Case. 10 Clark & F. 200, 8 Eng.
Rep. (H.L. 1843).
52. See supra note 13.
53. Beaumont v. Morgan, 427 F.2d 667 (lst Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 882 (1970).
54. Hoye v. State. 169 Miss. I 11, 112, 152 So. 644, 645 (1934). But see McNeil v. Director, Patuxent
Inst.. 407 U.S. 245 (1972) (where confinement, after criminal conviction, for a longer period than the original
sentence was held to be in violation of due process).
55. See supra text following note 50.
56. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d at 716. 388 P.2d at 720, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 488.
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and to require reimbursement from such a person would be to
apply a law inequitably - to impose class legislation.57 This theory
was articulated in Kirchner and Hawley, which apparently have
found followings only in their home state of California. Other
jurisdictions, both before and after these decisions, have upheld
the validity of reimbursement statutes, usually relying on a moral
obligation of the relatives, or a rational basis for distinguishing
the parties held responsible, such as pre-existing legal duty to pro-
vide support.58
Because the appellant in Chill emphasized improprieties in the
commitment procedure, constitutional challenges to the validity
of reimbursement itself were not addressed. Chill, however, may
offer some clues as to how those constitutional challenges will
fare. An essential factor in determining the validity of reimburse-
ment statutes is the purpose of the commitment - the benefits
intended. Language in Mississippi's commitment statute and
language in the opinion suggest that a concern for public safety
and a desire to provide for persons unable to care for themselves
both motivate civil commitments in the state. The Mississippi com-
mitment statute defines a person in need of mental treatment as
one who is mentally ill so that he may "intentionally or uninten-
tionally physically injure himself or other persons" or be "unable
to care for himself.""0 Similarly, the court in Chill described per-
sons who, "because of their illnesses, present a threat of harm
to persons and property of others - as well as to themselves
*"1 Noting that both the person committed and the general
public benefit from the commitment, the court found that "it is not
unreasonable to require the patient, his family, or his estate to
pay at least a part of the bill."62 Because the court clearly recogniz-
ed that commitment benefits both the public and the patient, it
is unlikely that it will be persuaded to require the state to bear
the entire expense of care and treatment when those private par-
ties deemed appropriate are able to pay. It is, however, possible
that the court may be convinced to limit the amount that may be
charged the patient, his estate, or his family; since the court did
recognize some benefit to the public and stated that it was
57. Kirchner, 60 Cal. 2d at 717, 388 P.2d at 721, 36 Cal. Rptr. at 489. (Note that this case was vacated
in Department of Mental Hygiene of California v. Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965)).
58. See supra note 40.
59. See supra text following note 50.
60. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-21-61 (1972).
61. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 579.
62. Id. (emphasis added).
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reasonable to expect payment for "at least a part of the bill"" from
those private parties. Perhaps these limitations will be exercised
in cases examined on the basis of individual circumstances in each
particular situation.6'
The challenge recognized in Kirchner may pose a more serious
threat to Mississippi's reimbursement statute, as applied to fami-
ly members.6 Since Chill involved reimbursement from the pa-
tient's estate, the question raised in Kirchner was not addressed
specifically, but may well prove the most likely basis for a future
constitutional challenge to the Mississippi Hospital Reimburse-
ment Commission Act. That act does not limit the persons
chargeable to those already owing a legal duty of support. Rather,
the statute, as amended in 1983, provides that, among others, a
spouse may be held chargeable.66 Since a wife apparently has no
legal duty to support her husband,67 the Mississippi statute requires
support from one not otherwise responsible, possibly inviting a
challenge on the grounds stated in Kirchner. The holding in Chill
made clear that the patient's estate may be charged, but because
the Chill court construed the former code section, requiring pay-
ment from persons legally responsible, rather than the new code
section, requiring payment from the patient, his estate, parents
of a minor child, or a spouse, little may be gleaned from the case
by those desiring to predict the fate of a wife from whom the state
seeks reimbursement for the care of her mentally ill husband. In
Chill, the court often employs such phrases as those "legally
liable" 8 and one "legally responsible"; 9 but whether such phrases
are more indicative of the statute being construed (the former code
section), or more indicative of a tendency to limit reimbursement
on the basis of reasoning similar to that found in Kirchner, re-
mains to be seen. Mississippi's revised reimbursement statute
70
specifically enumerates those persons who may be liable for sup-
port. However, by including "spouse" in that enumeration, the
63. Id.
64. See supra text following note 50.
65. It is, however, essential to remember, when analyzing the ramifications of Chill and its position relative
to trends in the law, that both Hawley and Kirchner have been limited to California, and that reimbursement
statutes are generally upheld by the courts. See supra note 37.
66. MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 (Supp. 1983). The legislature did not amend § 41-7-79, which requires
that the commission adopt policies that will not work a hardship on the legally responsible private parties.
Thus, as the law now stands, a wife may be required to reimburse the state for the care of her mentally ill
husband, but she is not afforded any protection from policies that might cause her financial hardship.
67. See Dodge v. Knowles, 114 U.S. 430, 435 (1885) ("The obligation to pay for the supplies of the family
is ordinarily a debt of the husband ... .
68. Chill, 429 So. 2d at 578.
69. Id. at 580.
70. Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-7-71 (Supp. 1983).
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legislature may have invited a constitutional challenge based on
the Kirchner holding - that there is no basis for requiring reim-
bursement from a person with no pre-existing legal duty of
support.
Elizabeth Lee DeCoux
